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11. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A Discoven Exception Exists to LC. 6 19-4902, Failure to Applv the Exception 
Was Fundamental Error. And the Record Adeauatelv Demonstrates that Mr. 
Person's Petition was Timelv Under the Exception. 
Mark Person has argued that the District Court committed fundamental error in 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief as time barred on the claim that counsel was 
ineffective in negotiating an unenforceable plea agreement when the claim was filed well within 
a year ofwhen the ineffective assistance was and could have been reasonably discovered. The 
state has attempted to rebut this by arguing that: I )  Mr. Person has not shown that there is a 
discovery exception to the statute o f  limitations which is applicable in post-conviction; 2) that i f  
there is such an exception, it goes to the foundation o f  his case for purposes o f  application o f  the 
doctrine o f  fundamental error; and 3) that even i f  there is a discovery exception, Mr. Person has 
not adequately demonstrated when he could have or did learn about his claim o f  ineffective 
assistance o f  counsel. However, none o f  these arguments are persuasive. 
The state's first argument is that there is no discovery exception to I.C. 5 19-4902. In 
support o f  this, the state cites and misconstrues language from Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 
189, 191, 30 P.3d 967,969 (2001). See Respondent's Brief at page 8. In Evensiosky, the 
petitioner argued that the time for filing his petition for review should have been tolled because a 
discovery exception should apply and because he was denied meaningful access to the courts. 
The Supreme Court declined to apply a discovery exception because Evensiosky had discovered 
the basis for his claim in post-conviction before the one year statute o f  limitations had run. Thus, 
late discovery could not justify a tolling o f  the statute o f  limitations. In making this ruling, the 
Supreme Court stated, "There is no discovery exception in I.C. 5 19-4902, and the facts o f  the 
case do not warrant application of a discovery exception. LC. 5 19-4902 expressly limits a 
party's time to bring a claim for post-conviction review to one year." Evensiosky v. State, 136 
Idaho at 189,30 P.3d at 967 (emphasis added). The state has construed this language to mean 
that not only is there no discovery exception set out in the statute, but also that no such exception 
exists or can exist under case law. 
That this is a misconstruction of Evensiosky is evident from reading the remainder of the 
paragraph quoted by the state. The remainder of the paragraph reads: "Further, Evensiosky 
discovered the basis for his claim in mid-May of 1997. This was well before his time for filing a 
post-conviction review petition expired on July 3, 1997." Id. Had the Supreme Court meant the 
first part of the paragraph to establish that not only does the statute not expressly incorporate a 
discovery exception in its language, but also that no such exception can be applied by the courts, 
then the second part of the paragraph would have been unnecessary and confusing. When the 
entire paragraph of Evensiosky is read, it becomes clear that the Supreme Court was not saying 
that no discovery exception could be grafted onto the statute by case law, but rather, that the 
statute itself does not contain such an exception. 
And, indeed, other case law demonstrates that such an exception has been applied by the 
Idaho courts. 
First, it is important to understand that exceptions to the statute of limitations can be 
found even though the statutory language itself does not mention them. Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 
957,88 P.3d 776 (Ct. App. 2003), is illustrative. Idaho Code $ 19-4902 does not contain any 
express provision for the tolling of the statute when a prisoner is held in conditions which 
effectively deny access to the courts. However, Sayas employs such a tolling stating, without any 
need for analysis as to where the court gets the power to add in the exception, "However, the 
time limitation may be enlarged when the defendant has been effectively denied access to the 
courts." 139 Idaho at 959, 88 P.3d at 778, citing Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788,792,992 P.2d 
783,797 (Ct. App. 1999). Anderson holds that compliance with the statute of limitations in a 
post-conviction application is not jurisdictional, but rather is an affirmative defense that can be 
waived if not pleaded by the state. 
Second, case law has established a discovery exception to 9 19-4902. The exception was 
applied in Fox v. State, 129 Idaho 881,934 P.2d 947 (Ct. App. 1997). In Fox, the Court of 
Appeals held that a post-conviction claim with regard to ineffective assistance of counsel in a 
Rule 35 motion was not untimely even though it was filed later than the time limits set out in § 
19-4902 (within one year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of 
a proceeding following an appeal). Instead of rejecting Fox's claim because it was filed more 
than one year after the time for a direct appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the claims relative 
to the Rule 35 motion, which was not decided until some three years after the date of conviction, 
ran from the date of the time for an appeal from the denial of the Rule 35 motion, not the date of 
the expiration for the time for filing an appeal from the conviction itself. In other words, Fox 
applied a discovery exception to LC. § 19-4902, as Fox could not have discovered the ineffective 
assistance of counsel until the Rule 35 motion was denied. 
Likewise, a discovery exception was applied in Lake v. State, 124 Idaho 259,858 P.2d 
798 (Ct. App. 1993), which held that an application for post-conviction relief claiming 
ineffective assistance of counsel in a probation revocation proceeding was timely even though 
filed more than five years after the conviction, when it was filed within five years of the 
probation revocation proceeding. Lake held that the time for the running of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim could not begin until the ineffective assistance occurred and was 
discovered, specifically when the revocation proceeding was held. 
Contrary to the state's argument, there is a discovery exception to I.C. 5 19-4902. 
The state's second argument is that even if a discovery exception exists, the error in not 
applying the exception was not fundamental error and so Mr. Person can obtain no relief. 
Fundamental error is error which so profoundly distorts the process that it produces 
manifest injustice and deprives the accused of the fundamental right to due process. State v. 
Anderson, 144 Idaho 743,748, 170 P.3d 886,891 (2007). By not applying the discovery 
exception to the statute of limitations, the District Court denied Mr. Persoil access to the courts 
that would otherwise be open to him. As stated in Evensiosky, access to the courts is a 
fundamental right grounded in the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 136 
Idaho at 190,30 P.3d at 968 (2001). No error is more fundamental than an error which 
erroileously closes and locks the courthouse doors. Contrary to the state's argument, the error in 
this case can be addressed under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Anderson, supra. See 
also, Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759,762,718 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Lastly, the state argues that even if there is a discovery exception, Mr. Person did not 
adequately demonstrate when he could have or did learn about his claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel. However, the record makes clear when Mr. Person's claim could have been or was 
discovered. 
Mr. Persoil could not and did not discover that he had received ineffective assistance of 
counsel in entry of his Rule 11 guilty plea until the Court of Appeals held that the district court 
did not err in denying his motion to correct his presenlence investigation report and his Rule 35 
motion. Until that opinion was rendered, Mr. Person had no way of knowing that counsel was 
ineffective in negotiating and advising him to enter a coilditional plea based upon a condition 
that could not be performed. That opinion was rendered on October 31,2007, and review was 
denied by the Supreme Court on March 11,2008. Mr. Person's petition for post-conviction 
relief which was filed in 2007 was therefore timely, as it was filcd wcll within one year of the 
time that he could have and did know of the ineffective assistance of his counsel. 
Contrary to the state's assertions, there is in fact a discovery exception to the time limits 
of I.C. § 19-4902, the error in not applying that exception was fundamental error, and Mr. Person 
did adequately demonstrate when he could have and did discover the basis for his claim in post- 
conviction. Therefore, the summary dismissal of his petition should now be reversed. 
111. CONCLUSION 
As set out in the Opening Brief and above, Mr. Person's petition was not time-barred. He 
therefore asks that this Court reverse the order summarily dismissing his petition and remand for 
an evidentiary hearing on the merits. 
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